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The Cork City flood of November 2009: Lessons for flood risk management 
and climate change adaptation at the urban scale   
Flood hazards are a pressing challenge in several Irish and European cities and their 
impacts seem likely to intensify as climate change brings sea level rise, changes in 
storm patterns and increases in rainfall. Drawing on the example of Cork City and the 
November 2009 flood in particular this paper evaluates contemporary policy and 
decision-making responses to flood hazards to determine whether they are sufficient to 
address current and future flood risks and vulnerabilities. It is clear that current policy 
and practice remains heavily influenced by a risk management paradigm that 
emphasises physical exposure and largely ignores socio-economic vulnerability. Floods 
and the losses they induce are seen as identical while engineering and technological 
fixes are viewed as the optimal means of reducing future flood losses. This framing of 
flood hazards is shaped by several influences including the historic evolution of flood 
policy and current institutional structures. The November 2009 flood highlights the 
limits of current policy and practice. Recent changes in national and European policy 
may also prove to be ineffective in facilitating effective adaptation and further changes 
in policy and practice are likely to be required.  
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Introduction  
Climate models indicate that increases in winter stream flow are likely in many parts of 
Ireland (Sweeney, et al. 2003, Charlton, et al. 2006, McGrath and Lynch, 2008, Steele-
Dunne, et al. 2008), with the implication that more flooding is in store for riverine residents.  
Places like Cork City, which have a long history of human adjustment to floods, may be at 
particular risk.  Although the unexpectedly destructive flood of November 20
th
 2009 was 
exacerbated by the decision to release water from the hard-pressed Inniscarra Dam, it 
provides a preview of the type of extreme event that is likely to become more common in the 
future. It also serves as a test of existing flood policies and offers clues to the climate change 
preparedness of Irish cities, contexts where multiple stakeholders share responsibilities for 
anticipating and responding to flood hazards. In particular it provides an opportunity to 
review the adequacy of existing flood adaptation measures against the backdrop of Ireland’s 
first Catchment Flood Risk Assessment and Management Study (CFRAM), a diagnostic 
planning tool that is becoming the centrepiece of Ireland’s implementation of the European 
Union (EU) Floods Directive, part of efforts to improve the safety and security of flood 
threatened areas throughout the continent. 
Climate change adaptation in cities  
Climate change adaptation in cities has become an increasing focus of research by 
geographers and others (Fünfgeld, 2010, Carter, 2011, Hallegatte, et al. 2011, Hanson, et al. 
2011, Hunt and Watkiss, 2011, Leichenko, 2011, Rosenzweig, et al. 2011).  Adaptation 
research draws from and builds on an already extensive literature on natural hazards in urban 
contexts (Mitchell, 1999, Pelling 2003, Pelling and Wisner, 2009, Chatterjee, 2010). Flood 
hazards in particular have begun to receive increased attention from researchers across 
Europe (Mitchell, 2003, Johnson, et al. 2007, Parker, et al. 2007, Parvin, et al. 2008, Whittle, 
et al. 2010, Dawson, et al. 2011, Walker and Burningham, 2011) while the challenges 
associated with adaptation in Europe (Naess, et al. 2005, Amundesen, et al. 2010, Biesbroek, 
et al. 2010, Lugeri, et al. 2010, Mechler, et al. 2010,) and Ireland (Falaleela, et al. 2011, 
Kopke and O’Mahony, 2011) are also the subject of increasing scrutiny. Out of these 
different bodies of work has come a concern that the high adaptive capacity present in many 
developed countries may not automatically lead to successful adaptation (O’Brien, et al. 
2004, Repetto, 2008, Moser, 2010). 
The literature on climate change adaptation has highlighted several circumstances that 
enable or hinder effective decision-making in the face of hazards. Amundsen, et al. (2010) 
examine decision-making among municipal officials in Norway and conclude that direct 
personal experience of hazards is the most important facilitator of adaptation but that this 
often leads to a highly reactive decision-making process. A lack of recent direct experience of 
hazards may attenuate concern and reduce the likelihood of adaptive or preparatory actions 
being taken (Harvatt, et al. 2011). It has also been suggested that reactive decision-making, 
particularly in response to surprise events may not bring about new or radical changes in 
policy but surprise events can act as a catalyst for changes that were already likely (Johnson, 
et al. 2005, Penning-Rowsell, et al. 2006).  
The ways in which knowledge is shared and disseminated among officials and 
stakeholders and across different levels of governance also helps to shape decision-making 
and policy (Carmin, et al. 2009). Top down approaches that originate from national or 
international sources or other outside influences are often not the main drivers of local change 
(Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011) and top down policy can be ineffective due to slow rates of 
implementation at lower levels of governance (Tunstall, et al. 2009). Narratives that raise 
awareness and the actions they promote can also be heavily influenced by institutional 
structures or organisational cultures (Harries and Penning-Rowsell, 2011). These factors are 
important considerations in both an Irish and a European context. Flood hazards policy in 
Ireland is largely formulated at a national level although it has undergone some modification 
in recent years in response to policy changes at the European level. Cross-scale governance is 
increasingly important in European cities as the EU plays an increased role in both hazards 
and climate adaptation policy.  
A mismatch between the operating requirements of institutions under “normal” 
conditions and during emergencies can play a central role in influencing the vulnerability and 
adaptation of local populations. Institutions that have been designed with clearly understood 
areas of responsibility, well defined geographical jurisdictions and appropriate types of 
expertise do not always perform effectively when faced with hazards that emerge quickly, 
cross institutional borders, combine disparate causes, produce impacts in distant places, and 
require the application of cross-disciplinary knowledge (Robbins, et al. 2008). All of these 
challenges are present in Ireland, even though floods are not a new problem.  Floods have 
complex human and non-human drivers that do not fit neatly within the skill sets of 
professionals in the agencies that are charged with their management. Governance structures 
that were perhaps suited to the circumstances that prevailed at the time they were created may 
not be well positioned to address contemporary issues (Dodds, et al. 2010).  
Power relations both within and between institutions have been identified as an 
important influence on the decision-making process (Koch, et al. 2007). It is also likely that 
the power of formal state actors plays a particularly import role in defining approaches to the 
issue, influencing the behaviour of other state and non state institutions and actors. Koch, et 
al. (2007) have emphasised the role of institutional actors in South Africa in defining climate 
change and ranking it relative to other concerns such as economic growth, job creation or 
poverty reduction. How a problem is defined, whether it is considered a problem at all and 
how its importance is perceived relative to other issues are among the key factors influencing 
the types of decisions that are subsequently taken (O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999, Koch, et. al. 
2007, O’Connor, 2001). It is clear that adaptation to urban climate change is influenced by a 
variety of situational contexts that set the boundary conditions for framing decisions and 
management strategies. The flood experience of Cork in 2009 offers an opportunity to study 
these contexts at close range. 
Flooding in Cork 
In many ways Cork City provides an ideal case study for an analysis of decision-making and 
policy responses to both contemporary flood hazards and the challenges likely to emerge 
from climate change. Due to its physical setting the city has a long history of exposure to 
flood hazards. Much of the city centre is built on what is now a large island between two 
channels of the River Lee, both of which are tidal. These channels are the last vestiges of a 
more extensive surface drainage network. Much of the modern centre island lies at elevations 
just above the highest spring tides. As a result it is exposed to both fluvial and tidal flooding. 
On the western side of the city, lands on both river banks form part of the flood plain of the 
River Lee, an area of frequent inundation. On the eastern side, much of what is now the 
docklands area is situated on land reclaimed from the estuary of the Lee between 1774 and 
1841 (Coughlan, 2009). This district remains liable to flooding due to its low elevation and 
poor drainage but despite its exposure, this portion of the city has been primed for extensive 
redevelopment. With the relocation of all of the city’s port functions to locations further 
downstream, the long term plans for this area include the construction of large scale 
residential and commercial developments (Cork City Council 2001, Cork City Council, 2008, 
Cork City Council, 2009). The hydrology of the River Lee has also been modified by the 
construction of two upstream dams at Inniscarra and Carrigadrohid. These were completed 
during the 1950s and were built primarily for hydroelectric power, not flood control. 
However they have been used to reduce floods in the past (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001). 
Published research reveals that two hundred and ninety floods were recorded in Cork 
between 1841 and 1988 (Tyrrell and Hickey 1991) while several additional floods occurred 
between 1988 and the present. There have been numerous relatively minor events but the 
city’s history also includes large floods leading to loss of life and substantial economic costs. 
The earliest documented reports of flooding in Cork date from 1633 when several bridges are 
believed to have been swept away by the River Lee (Tuckey, 1837 cited Hickey, 2010). In 
1789 a river flood described as being between 1.5m to 2m deep in some parts of the city 
killed at least one resident (Cawley, et al. 2005, Hickey, 2010). One of the most severe floods 
struck in November 1853 when 12 people were killed, with several of these deaths occurring 
when St. Patrick’s Bridge was partially swept away (Cawley, et al. 2005, Hickey, 2010). 
River floods in 1916 were among the worst experienced and were described as comparable to 
the 1853 event (Cawley, et al. 2005). It is worth noting that the 2009 flood was not the first 
time a release of water from the Inniscarra dam led to flooding in Cork City with similar but 
less severe floods having occurred in 1960 and 1988 (Hickey, 2010).  
Methodology 
The research on which this investigation of the Cork flood is based was part of a larger study 
of urban vulnerability to flooding in Ireland that examined,  how available knowledge is used 
by local decision-makers in preparation for hazard events, how hazards are framed and 
conceptualised by those decision-makers for the purposes of policy-making and management,   
and whether current institutional structures and policies are sufficient to meet the challenges 
of contemporary hazards and future change. A content analysis of the minutes of 192 
meetings of Cork City Council held between January 2001 and January 2010 provided an 
illustration of decision-making responses to floods over recent years. While the minutes 
provide a limited summary of the meetings they nevertheless present a clear indication of the 
types of policies formulated and illuminate some of the motivations behind particular 
decisions. A similar analysis of the records of Dáil Éireann debates over the period 1985 to 
2010 provided data on the evolution of national decision-making over an extended time 
period. The investigation of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Environment into 
flooding and severe winter weather conducted over the course of seven meetings held 
between December 1
st
 2009 and March 23
rd
 2010 provided a unique opportunity to examine 
the views of numerous local stakeholders into the flooding experienced in Cork and other 
parts of Ireland in November 2009. The records of this investigation provide over 160 pages 
of transcripts which were analysed in conjunction with the final report published in the 
aftermath of the investigation. Together these provided a valuable picture of the ways in 
which floods are conceptualised and framed by local actors and of the types of responses and 
adjustments to flood hazards they wished to see implemented. These content analyses were 
combined with a review of relevant policy documents. Finally semi-structured interviews 
with local executive officials, elected decision-makers and other stakeholders provided data 
on framings of hazards that were employed, likely future policies and the types of knowledge 
used in local decision-making. These interviews were completed less than three months 
before the November 2009 flood. This proved to be fortuitous because they provide insights 
into perceptions of flooding in advance of this event which can be contrasted with the 
discourses that have developed in its aftermath.   
The November 2009 flood  
The November 2009 flood was the most severe to affect Cork City in many years. It was 
triggered by heavy rain that led the Electricity Supply Board (ESB), owners and operators of 
the Inniscarra Dam, to release large volumes of water downstream in order to ensure its 
safety in the face of excessive inflows. At the peak of the flood it has been estimated that up 
to 535 tonnes of water per second was passing through the dam and the ESB has claimed that 
the event had a return period of 800 years (Hickey, 2010). Much of the city centre and the 
western suburbs experienced heavy flooding. Fortunately no fatalities occurred but economic 
losses and disruption to the life of the city was considerable. The municipal water treatment 
plant was damaged, leaving many of the city’s residents without water for several days 
(Hickey, 2010). Classes at University College Cork were cancelled after a large portion of the 
campus was flooded. Flood waters also surrounded the Mercy University Hospital requiring 
key staff to travel to and from work by boat. It has been estimated that the total economic 
costs of the flood may exceed €100 million (Hickey, 2010).  
Public attention has focused on two aspects of the event: (1) a perceived failure to 
give adequate warning to the population of the city and (2) a belief that the flood itself should 
have been prevented or more effectively managed. Both reactions have focused attention on 
the roles of several public agencies that have responsibilities for flood hazards preparedness 
and mitigation, most notably Cork City Council and the ESB. The post event discourses 
visible in media coverage and in the testimony of multiple witnesses before the Joint 
Oireachtas Committee on the Environment suggest that many stakeholders fail to distinguish 
between the physical event and the losses it induces. This misunderstanding of flood risk 
emphasizes physical exposure but does not consider other drivers of loss. This paper 
examines reasons for the persistence of this view and the ways in which the 2009 event has 
highlighted some of its weaknesses. Despite recent changes of practice that may address 
some of the resulting problems, there are reasons for concern about continuing deficiencies in 
management of current and future flood hazards.   
Prevention and control of flooding 
The roles and responsibilities of various flood hazards managers in Ireland have evolved over 
a period of more than sixty years but the main public agencies with authority to act remain 
the Office of Public Works (OPW) and the local authorities (City and Council Councils). In 
the aftermath of the Report of the Flood Policy Review Group in 2004, the OPW was 
designated as the national lead agency for flood risk management for both river and coastal 
flooding. The local authorities remained responsible for storm water and road surface 
drainage, for some coastal protection works and for the regulation of planning and 
development in all areas including flood plains. This division of duty represented a 
realignment of responsibilities after widespread floods in 2002, particularly in Dublin. 
Previously, responsibility for flooding was more diffused with the OPW having some 
responsibility for river flooding, although this had historically focused on the drainage of 
agricultural lands. Some powers to address river flooding were also vested in the local 
authorities while responsibility for coastal flooding lay with the Department of 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources.  As a result of the Flood Policy Review 
Group’s work, Ireland acquired a somewhat more streamlined and centralised system of flood 
hazard management. 
While the role of the OPW is now clearly described as one of flood risk management, 
historically it had as much to do with economic and agricultural policy as it did with 
environmental hazards. In particular, it had discharged many functions under the Arterial 
Drainage Acts 1945-1995. These laws were originally established not as flood hazards 
mitigation mechanisms but as a framework for the improvement of agricultural land. The 
focus on drainage of agricultural lands remained central to the mission of the OPW until the 
mid 1990s when increased emphasis was placed on urban flooding for the first time. The 
economic benefits that might accrue from the drainage of agricultural land were central to the 
passage of the Arterial Drainage Act in 1945 and this is evident in the records of 
parliamentary debates from the time. Hazards policy and decision-making rarely occurs in 
isolation from social and economic contexts that shape both the formation of policy and the 
vulnerabilities of human populations (Mitchell, et al. 1989, Watts, 1989, Mustafa 1998, Platt 
1999, O’Neill 2006).  
The Arterial Drainage Acts were the keystone of Ireland’s flood hazard policy from 
1945 until the mid 1990s when emphasis began to shift towards flood prevention in urban 
areas. Despite this change, the emphasis on drainage has continued to influence how flood 
hazards are conceptualised and understood, as well as the types of responses that are adopted. 
Institutional cultures formed when engineering and technological approaches were the norm 
can remain dominant even after alternative policies have become the favoured option (Harries 
and Penning Rowsell, 2011). Floods continue to be viewed fundamentally as a problem of 
drainage and the reasons for addressing them in this way are seen primarily as economic, 
with little consideration given to future climate change.  
An analysis of the City Council minutes in Cork, Dáil Éireann debates and interviews 
with local officials illustrates the dominance or a risk management paradigm that emphasises 
the control and prevention of physical exposure as the primary policy-making objective. 
Floods are viewed as controllable through the application of expert knowledge, usually that 
of engineers. When flooding occurs it is considered a failure of these professionals to 
properly apply their expertise to the challenge. All floods regardless of their size, origin or 
impact are often treated in the same way at local City Council meetings. Typically a City 
Councillor will ask that the City Manager direct the engineering or drainage department to 
conduct an investigation into a specific flooding problem and to find a solution that prevents 
the flood from reoccurring. The approach is similar regardless of whether the flood is simply 
an accumulation of water on an individual street that creates a traffic hazard, or a larger event 
that inundates multiple properties. In almost all cases floods are seen as preventable given the 
appropriate level of engineering expertise and the availability of sufficient funding. 
Discussions emphasise the “prevention” and “elimination” of floods and the “protection” of 
local residents. This appears to be largely supported by the City Managers whose replies 
often focus on the availability of funding and other resources to provide for engineering 
solutions rather than the wisdom of the engineering solutions themselves. When a flood 
occurs it is often seen as an indication that the City’s artificial drainage network has failed to 
function adequately because it is assumed that it should be possible to virtually eliminate 
flooding in a modern city. This illustrates how local decision-making is the product of both a 
dominant discourse and related institutional structures at both local and national levels. The 
dominant discourse views floods as something that can be managed and controlled. This links 
to the institutional structure of local government in Ireland which almost always assigns 
responsibility for flood hazards to the engineering or drainage department of the local 
authority. A loop is created where engineering is considered the optimal solution in part 
because engineers are given responsibility for floods, but that responsibility is given because 
floods are viewed as a problem engineers can fix. The historical focus on arterial drainage 
undoubtedly shaped these structures and institutional cultures formed when engineering was 
the preferred flood mitigation policy can continue to shape local practice. This focus on 
engineering excludes different perspectives (e.g. natural science) and knowledge (e.g. human 
ecological), among others, which might offer alternative strategies for flood loss mitigation.  
A similar trend is visible in the discussion of flood hazards in the national parliament. 
An examination of the records of Dáil Éireann from 1985 through to 2009 shows that 
flooding is an issue that is raised with increasing frequency in parliament. Local TDs 
frequently raise questions regarding flooding in a particular location within their 
constituencies. The TD will typically request that the relevant Government Minister direct the 
attention of the OPW to the flooding in this location. The expectation is that the OPW will 
investigate flooding in this location and if funding is available provide an engineering 
solution in an attempt to ensure that flooding does not occur there again. In a similar manner 
to the discussions of flood at the level of local government, flood “elimination” and “anti-
flooding” measures are viewed as the optimal means of ensuring that flood losses are reduced 
or eliminated.  
The dominance of this tech-fix discourse was particularly evident in the recent inquiry 
of a parliamentary committee into the widespread floods of November 2009. Preventing the 
floods from reoccurring was seen as the only way of ensuring that losses and disruption 
experienced in Cork City and along the River Shannon were not repeated. As one TD 
observed during a meeting of the Committee on February 23
rd
 2010,  
“I welcome our visitors from the ESB, but with no disrespect, I have heard the same history and 
geography lessons in previous presentations relating to rainfall, etc. What the people in the 
midlands and people in Cork and throughout the country want is not history lessons but a 
solution to the problem”.  
Another commented “Much of this flooding could have been avoided and it caused 
unnecessary damage”. These comments and many others made during the Committee’s 
meetings illustrate the dominance of a conception of flood hazards that assumes that flooding 
can be prevented or at least dramatically reduced through a combination of dams, weirs and 
flood defences. This approach to flood risk management also creates a reactive decision-
making process in which local policy and practice is heavily shaped by a retrospective 
analysis of past events.  In the present era of concern about increasing future climate risks 
this approach may be fraught with difficulties.   
A conception of flood hazards that sees floods as a risk largely external to society and 
views flood prevention as the centre piece of any flood hazards mitigation efforts was also 
evident in interview responses. Engineering interventions appeared to be viewed as the ideal 
option both for the management of current flood hazards and for any future hazards due to the 
impacts of climate change. Most respondents were confident that not only was engineering 
the preferred option for the future, but that it was providing protection against current flood 
risks. Several respondents were confident that the hydroelectric dams on the River Lee 
allowed for control and management of the river that would prevent flooding. They focused 
on coastal flooding as this was viewed as lacking the same control. An engineer commented,  
“there was a hydro electric scheme built on the Lee and obviously that has been beneficial in 
terms of controlling our river flooding. If there are heavy rainfall events or adverse conditions 
and we know about them in advance then the ESB can deal with the river water coming down”.  
He contrasted this perceived control over river flooding with the exposure to coastal flooding, 
commenting “but we’ve no control at the other end”.  
These comments were made less than three months before what was mistakenly 
perceived as reliable control failed in November 2009. Respondents saw flood defences for 
particularly exposed areas of the city as the solution to current exposure and large scale flood 
barriers as the solution to future coastal flood exposure due to sea level rise and any changes 
in storm patterns that may occur. Funding was seen as virtually the only limitation to these 
projects. As one City Councillor commented “The problem at the moment of course is 
funding. We can’t afford to do something like that. It would be so expensive”. However 
many respondents appeared to view the construction of such barriers as inevitable because 
they saw them as the only viable option, regardless of cost. It is worth noting that the recently 
published Draft Catchment Flood Risk Management Plan for the Lee Catchment concluded 
that such a coastal flood barrier for Cork currently fails to pass a cost benefit analysis but 
may do so in the future (Office of Public Works, et al. 2010). 
The 2009 flood as a failure of current policy  
The November 2009 flood in Cork highlights several weaknesses in contemporary flood 
hazards policy in Ireland and Europe. Engineering solutions and dams in particular often 
prevent smaller more frequent events but the false sense of security this can create often 
increases vulnerability to larger but less frequent floods (Wisner, et al. 2004, López-Marrero 
and Yarnal, 2010). Engineering solutions certainly work in some cases. During a flood in 
1986 it is estimated that the attenuation provided by the two dams on the River Lee retained 
the water levels in Cork City at almost 1m lower than would have been the case had the dams 
not been present (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001). However this false sense of security may have 
helped to increase the vulnerability of Cork City to larger floods. Despite some forewarning 
of the potential for misplaced confidence (Fitzpatrick and Bree, 2001), Cork appears to have 
been largely unprepared for larger flooding events. While it was fortunate that no fatalities 
occurred in November 2009 this appears to have been down to luck and a prompt response 
from the emergency services, rather than to the overall level of preparedness. Prior to 2009, 
the two dams to the west of Cork were seen as providing an effective means of preventing 
river flooding. While the City had an emergency plan for dealing with hazards of various 
kinds, no dedicated flood warning system was in place. Despite media coverage of the 
potential for flooding many of the city’s residents were unprepared and awoke in the early 
hours of the morning to find their homes quickly filling with water. It is clear that the false 
sense of security highlighted by hazards researchers elsewhere (Wisner, et. al., 2004, López 
and Yarnal, 2010) had well and truly set in. 
An emphasis on quantitative risk management and technological fixes has been 
extensively critiqued by geographers and other social scientists. Management approaches that 
view floods as a drainage problem that can be quantified, measured and assessed through 
natural science research methods assume that this approach will allow for the accurate 
calculation of return periods and the likelihood of future flood events. This assumption may 
prove to be inaccurate in the context of global climate change as the retrospective analysis of 
past events becomes a less reliable guide to the future. Recent research in Ireland has already 
expressed concern that analysis of past climate is no longer a reliable guide for future events 
(Kiely, et al. 2010). Probabilistic thinking which often dominates risk assessment (Wilkinson, 
2010) focuses solely on the question of how often a particular event may occur. Such 
thinking alone may not be an effective means of preparing for future hazards as because it 
neglects to consider what may happen if a more extreme scenario unfolds (Jacob, et al. 2001). 
Not only are risk-based approaches imprisoned by past experience, they may encourage the 
selection of regulatory standards for flood prevention that are achievable by prevailing 
engineering technologies at acceptable cost, rather than more stringent safety margins that are 
more technically challenging and less cost effective. Risk based approaches often imply a 
level of control and manageability that may be inappropriate in the context of the complex 
challenges presented by flood hazards particularly in the context of global climatic change 
(Pidgeon and Butler, 2009). This belief in control, combined with the probabilistic approach 
allows little scope for consideration of unusual or surprise events that do not fit within its 
predictions. Such surprises are often the source of greatest catastrophe precisely because the 
fall outside our expectations (Beck, 2009). Risk management approaches often assume that 
such control can be achieved through the application of appropriate technological or 
engineering innovations. Hazards geographers have extensively critiqued overreliance on the 
application of an engineering fix to flood hazards (White, 1945, Platt, 1982, Penning-
Rowsell, et al. 1998, Penning-Rowsell, 2000, Wisner, et al, 2004, Changnon, 2005, Kahn and 
Mustafa, 2007, López-Marrero and Yarnal, 2010). These critiques have highlighted the 
potential for failure of engineering fixes and the likelihood of increased losses when events 
occur that exceed the design capacity of an engineering project (Wong and Zhao, 2001, 
Wisner, et al. 2004, Changnon, 2005; López-Marrero and Yarnal, 2010). Social theorists such 
as Ulrich Beck (1992, 1998, 1999, 2009) and Bruno Latour (1993, 2003) have offered even 
more sweeping critiques that question belief in the liner progression of modernity to a point 
where we can eliminate all of today’s risks and hazards. Engineering and technological fixes 
also tend to focus on the immediate cause of hazards rather than addressing their underlying 
drivers (Penning-Rowsell, et al. 1998, Penning-Rowsell, 2000). Risk based approaches that 
focus solely on engineering solutions to particular flood problems often fail to consider the 
variety of factors and contexts which have been found to influence hazards losses (Mustafa, 
1998, Pelling 1999, Cutter and Finch, 2008, Eakin, et al. 2010, López-Marrero and Yarnal, 
2010, Whittle, et al. 2010, Wolf, et al. 2010). Risk management approaches also privilege 
certain types of knowledge and certain practices or responses over others (Beck, 1992, 2009). 
By placing responsibility for flood hazards in the hands of a small group of experts the range 
of alternative responses to hazards (Mitchell, 2008) is limited. The role of expertise in 
environmental governance has been the subject of an extensive literature in geography and 
other social sciences with researchers increasingly recognising the complexity that the 
relationships between groups and individuals with varying degrees of expertise and 
knowledge brings to environmental decision-making (Birkenholtz, 2008, Prince, 2010).  
An additional key feature of both the Cork event and flooding in the Shannon basin 
are worth noting. All of the state agencies involved in testimony before the Oireachtas 
Committee on the Environment appeared keen to avoid responsibility for the flooding and its 
consequences. This is evident in the blame game that has taken place between Cork City 
Council and the ESB regarding whose responsibility it was to warn the public of the 
impending flood threat. In the words of the Oireachtas Committee’s report “Throughout our 
deliberations we repeatedly encountered a tendency on the part of various relevant State 
bodies to define their responsibilities more in terms of what they do not include rather than 
what they do” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2010).  
This tendency to avoid responsibility may be comparable to a phenomenon described 
as organised irresponsibility (Beck 2009). Focusing on national and international institutions 
Beck suggests that this organised irresponsibility can lead to the rationalisation and denial of 
the existence of particular risks. In the context of environmental hazards in local cities, 
organised irresponsibility may lead to acknowledgment that some risks exist (they are hard to 
deny after they have been realised as a flood disaster) but to a denial of responsibility for 
their occurrence or for the emergency management response to them.  The notion of 
organised irresponsibility suggests a deliberate attempt to avoid responsibility for hazards 
management but it is more likely that emergencies require managerial skills different from 
normal operations and these have not yet been institutionalized. This has been shown by 
Robbins et al. (2008, p. 96) in a U. S. study of challenges presented by West Nile Virus that 
demonstrated how government institutions and bureaucracies are constrained by “their 
specific geographic practices and boundary limits, as well as by the distinctive training, 
education, competences and governance capacities” available to them. In the same way flood 
hazards may fall between the cracks that separate agency jurisdictions. The intermittent 
nature of hazard events may add to this effect as they sit outside the day to day experience of 
most government organisations. Due to the long recurrence intervals of some hazards current 
managers may also have no direct experience of similar events. Strict adherence to the 
prescribed missions and responsibilities of different agencies is likely to create both overlaps 
and gaps in the decision-making structure that may explain the appearance of irresponsibility. 
Regardless of the exact cause of the irresponsibility it is clear that events such as the Cork 
floods create numerous challenges for contemporary institutional and decision-making 
structures and future flood hazards policies will need to take this into account if they are to 
successfully address both contemporary flood hazards and future climate change.  
The November 2009 flood in Cork occurred just before the Draft Catchment Flood 
Risk Management Plan for the Lee Catchment was published in February 2010. The CFRAM 
model, part of Ireland’s implementation of the EU Floods Directive represents a new 
catchment based framework for flood risk management. As this model is likely to form the 
basis of flood hazards policy in Ireland for the foreseeable future it is necessary to consider 
the extent to which it can address the shortcomings highlighted by the 2009 flood and its 
utility as a framework within which adaptation to future flood hazards brought about by 
climate change might occur. The remainder of this paper focuses on the CFRAM model, 
illustrating its strengths and weaknesses. While the catchment based model has many 
advantages and it represents an improvement on past practices, several shortcomings may 
limit its ability to successfully address both current and future flood risks.  
Cross scale governance and the catchment model of flood risk management  
In Ireland policy and decision-making about environmental hazards crosses three levels of 
governance with the EU, national government and local authorities all playing important 
roles. The role of the EU has increased significantly in recent years, particularly through the 
implementation of the EU Floods Directive, which requires the adoption of a catchment 
based approach to flood risk management. As local and national governments take steps to 
comply with the stipulations of the Directive there is an appearance of top-down decision-
making. However this approach had already become part of the OPW’s policies when it was 
recommended by the Report of the Flood Policy Review Group in 2004. Local interviewees 
sought to portray this as evidence that Ireland was leading the way in policy innovation.  
However, this is misleading because the river basin model was introduced by the EU in the 
Water Framework Directive of 2000. This model has several strengths but it was developed 
in response to transnational floods in large river basins such as those experienced across 
Europe in 2002 and its application to the Irish context may not be as smooth as proponents 
would hope.  
There are several advantages to the river basin model. First, it codifies the importance 
of natural systems criteria in environmental management by tying the analysis to a spatially 
defined ecosystem. Second, within these boundaries it encourages coordinated decision-
making and holistic planning that minimizes negative spill over effects of separate decisions 
taken by different political jurisdictions.  In Ireland this approach is being implemented 
through Catchment Flood Risk Assessment and Management Studies (CFRAMSs) that lead 
to Catchment Flood Risk Management Plans (CFRMPs). The first of these studies was 
piloted in the Lee Catchment in Cork with others now ongoing on the Dodder in Dublin, the 
Suir in the south west of the country and in the Fingal East Meath region. While the 
CFRAMS model has the advantages mentioned above, particularly when compared to past 
approaches that were described by interviewees as “piecemeal” and “reactive”, it also has 
several shortcomings.  
By defining its unit of analysis as a river basin, the CFRAMSs model may 
unintentionally divert attention away from human drivers of flooding that transcend this unit 
(e.g. worldwide anthropogenic climate change as well as institutional biases towards 
technological fix adjustments and the primacy of economic investment criteria as guides for 
action). This is evident in the Draft CFRMP for the Lee Catchment. As the first of its kind 
this draft plan provides an early indication of how the CFRAMSs model will influence future 
flood hazards mitigation strategies in Ireland. The draft report focuses heavily on modelling 
physical exposure to flooding but the social drivers of vulnerability are not a significant 
portion of the analysis. While it emphasises that national policy now promotes the increased 
use of non-structural solutions to flooding (Office of Public Works, et al. 2010) and flood 
warnings are mentioned, the Lee CFRMP focuses on structural flood defences and 
alternatives are accorded little weight. Floods are conceptualised within a Source-Pathway-
Receptor model which focuses on the physical drivers of flood events. The draft CFRMP for 
the Lee Catchment does contain a short section on what is described as “social flood risk”. 
However this aspect of the analysis merely quantifies the numbers of properties within flood 
risk zones. Higher population density is equated with higher vulnerability and the analysis 
does not attempt to differentiate between residents within flood prone areas. Vulnerability is 
defined solely as a unit of exposure. This conception of vulnerability contrasts sharply with 
the extensive geographic literature on the socioeconomic factors that shape hazard losses 
(Kleinosky, et al. 2006, Cutter and Finch, 2008, Eakin, et al. 2009, Mustafa, et al. 2010, Wolf 
et al. 2010). Whether it is possible to present information on vulnerability in formats that are 
easily applicable to policy-making is the subject of ongoing debate among vulnerability 
researchers (Mustafa, et al. 2010) but its exclusion from current policy in Ireland appears to 
be a conceptual rather than a methodological issue. The absence of a more expansive 
conceptualisation of vulnerability may prove to be a critical flaw in the design of CFRMPs 
that may only become clear during future disasters when some groups suffer greater losses 
than others.  
While economic losses receive some consideration in the analysis of flood hazards, 
they are narrowly defined. The draft CFRMP states that economic loss occurs when 
“floodwater gets above the threshold level of a building, for example an entrance door to a 
building” (Office of Public Works, et. al., 2010, p. 40). This interpretation neglects situations 
where buildings are isolated but not physically inundated or where the infrastructure on 
which they depend is damaged or disrupted without impairment of a building’s integrity. It 
also excludes the costs of business interruption and loss of customers for commercial 
enterprises as well as service denial for public sector facilities. Economic loss is tied to the 
ownership of fixed property and only where water enters regularly occupied structures. 
Damage to moveable property (e.g. vehicles), ancillary features (e.g. gardens), access routes 
(e.g. driveways) and external fittings is apparently not considered. This definition of 
economic loss also assumes that it is easy to identify which properties have been flooded and 
which have not. However studies of damage inflicted by a 2007 flood in Hull (U.K.) reveal 
that costly, unforeseen and delayed “secondary flooding” effects are common  (Whittle, et. 
al., 2010). In this case, water entered homes beneath the level of the floorboards. 
Homeowners initially assumed they have been spared but rising dampness and condensation 
emerged later to cause the same level of damage as if visible flooding had occurred. In such 
cases the expert judgment of insurance assessors becomes the criterion for aid, not the 
standards adopted in flood management regulations (Whittle, et. al., 2010). The apparently 
straightforward question of the spatial extent of a flood becomes increasingly complex and 
contested. If the narrow definition of flood losses employed in the draft Lee CFRMP 
becomes the standard for adjudicating insurance claims real victims may be officially 
declared to not have experienced flooding at all. Who decides when loss has been suffered 
and on what basis they do so may become a crucial matter in determining the course of 
recovery after flooding and the value of the CFRMP planning guidelines may be undercut.  
The EU Floods Directive was also criticised by some interviewees for its emphasis on 
river flooding to the exclusion of other types. The catchment based approach assumes that it 
is possible to quantify flood risk and to clearly identify different exposure units. This is 
potentially achievable for river and coastal flooding but unlikely for rainfall-driven flash 
floods. These deficiencies reflect the Flood Directive’s origins on the European mainland.  
There flooding typically covers very large areas in even larger river basins, and lasts for 
weeks or even months. With the notable exception of the Shannon, almost all other Irish 
rivers are relatively short and floods rarely last more than a few days (though their effects 
may be felt for much longer). Coastal floods also tend to be of shorter duration, usually a 
matter of hours coinciding with the peaks of tidal cycles. In estuarine locations like Cork City 
the most severe floods often result from a combination of fluvial and tidal drivers. These 
characteristics are fundamentally different from the continental European flood experience 
that has helped to shape the Floods Directive. While pan European flood strategies may 
encourage action at the local level and the catchment model has the potential to facilitate 
effective partnerships between local stakeholders, the ultimate success of EU policies may 
depend on their ability to leave space for the uniqueness of local places and contexts.  
Another influential aspect of governance structures in the Republic of Ireland, that 
contrasts with much of mainland Europe, is the relationship between local and national 
government and the role that each plays in policy that pertains to hazards and climate 
impacts. Compared to other countries, local government in Ireland often appears to have a 
“lesser status” (Callanan, 2003, p.475). Irish local authorities have significantly fewer areas 
of responsibility than European counterparts (Tierney, 2003). Despite this, local governments 
in Ireland do have responsibility for several functions that are of particular relevance to 
hazards mitigation and climate adaptation. City and County Councils are the primary 
regulators of planning and development within their territories (Grist, 2003). Local 
authorities are also responsible for emergency management because they usually provide 
local fire services and they are designated as lead agencies for managing weather 
emergencies (including flooding) under the National Framework for Emergency Management 
(Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2006).  
Local authorities retain these functions but their decision-making power is often 
curtailed by their limited ability to raise local revenue. While tax raising authority might 
seem essential to the autonomy of local government, since the abolition of domestic rates in 
1978 Irish local authorities have had a very limited ability to raise funds locally and are 
heavily dependent on grants from the national government. In 2002 almost 50% of local 
government funding came directly from central government with the remainder split almost 
evenly between commercial rates and other sources such as service charges (Dollard, 2003). 
This leaves local government particularly dependent on businesses whose commercial tax 
payments (rates) are the chief source of locally generated revenue. Such dependence may 
play an important role in shaping policy decisions as local authorities are keen to protect this 
revenue stream.  
Recently, there has been increased emphasis on land use planning and the regulation 
of development as a flood risk management tool.  This is highlighted by the 2009 publication 
of a set of guidelines - The Planning System and Flood Risk Management: Guidelines for 
Planning Authorities - that places local government in a key position to effect reductions in 
future flood losses. This new initiative is undoubtedly a major step forward from past 
practice. However as experience from other countries including the US illustrates, the shift 
from engineering to planning may not be enough to substantially reduce losses (Changnon, 
2000). Many of the most significant floods experienced in Ireland in recent years have 
occurred in already developed city centres and towns. Substantial building (including on 
flood plains) took place during the years of economic growth and tailed off before the 2009 
guidelines were published. Additional new development is likely to be much less for the 
foreseeable future due to the state of the national economy.  As a result the impact of land use 
planning on flood losses may be limited to avoiding additional increases in runoff from 
impermeable surfaces. When permission for new developments are sought there are also no 
guarantees that the flood risk guidelines will prevent inappropriate development on flood 
plains.  
There are several other aspects of the relationship between local and national 
governance in Ireland that may help to shape hazards policy. Local governments in Ireland 
have limited responsibilities for the provision of social services, with the exception of 
housing where they play an important role (Tierney, 2003). As a result almost none of the 
agencies responsible for flood hazards have any substantial role in the provision of social 
services. This institutional structure may help to exclude social drivers of loss from hazards 
policy because the decision-makers who are most likely to be aware of the social drivers of 
vulnerability are not included in the hazards decision-making process. The weakness of local 
government in Ireland may also limit the potential for partnerships across all levels of 
government to address environmental hazards. The weakness of Irish local government sits in 
contrast to other countries where partnerships across levels of government and between 
stakeholders have been most successful.  
The local emphasis of national politics in Ireland also plays a role in shaping many 
aspects of policy and this is no doubt true of hazards and climate policy. One of the criticisms 
of national politicians in Ireland is that they focus on local issues and neglect national 
priorities (Gallagher and Komito, 1999).  This is underlined in records of Dáil Éireann that 
show how local requests for flood relief are typical and national perspectives rarely get aired 
in debates or other parliamentary proceedings. This local emphasis in national policy is 
difficult to change because it may enhance the prospects of re-election for some 
representatives. Flood defences are a visual manifestation of action even if they are not 
always the optimal solution. Their physical presence and their ability to make flood waters 
disappear at least in the short term, ensures they remain the central focus of flood hazards 
policies.   
Conclusions  
It is clear that current exposures and vulnerabilities to flood hazards present numerous 
challenges for Cork and other Irish cities. These challenges are likely to intensify in the future 
as climate change brings increases in stream flow, sea level rise and changing storm patterns. 
Available evidence shows that current policy, decision-making and institutional structures 
may be ill suited to the dynamic challenges these changes will present. Current policy and 
practice at both local and national levels of governance remains heavily influenced by a 
largely reactive decision-making process based on the retrospective analysis of past events. 
Reactive experiential based responses are unlikely to facilitate effective adaptation because 
past experience may prove to be an unreliable guide to future hazards.  
Contemporary decision-making is also strongly influenced by a conceptualisation of 
flooding that fails to distinguish between the physical floods and the losses they induce, as 
well as an emphasis on large scale engineering and technological fixes as preferred responses. 
These perspectives reflect several influences including the often unique historical 
circumstances under which flood policies developed and the compromises made to 
accommodate established institutional structures. Experiences from the Lee floods of 2009 
and elsewhere highlight some of the potential pitfalls of this approach.  
Despite recent changes in both national and EU policy there remain several reasons 
for concern that current policies and institutional arrangements may prove insufficient to 
meet future challenges. Floods continue to be conceptualised largely as physical events and 
socio-economic influences on flood losses are not considered. Desirable modifications to the 
CFRAM model may include a wider conceptualisation of flood losses and their causes, and a 
broader range of alternative policy responses. The CFRAM model itself may also need to be 
modified to incorporate differences in the biophysical, socio-economic, cultural and 
institutional contexts of local places. A continuation of existing policies and practices may 
lead to similar losses like those experienced in Cork and other parts of Ireland in November 
2009. The CFRAM model undoubtedly represents a positive attempt to reorient policy and 
practice towards a more pro-active flood hazards management strategy but further 
reconceptualisation of policy and reorganisation of institutional structures may be required to 
successfully address contemporary and future challenges. 
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